CMTC TRENDS

Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)

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4QFY02- 1QFY03

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USER'S GUIDE

CMTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 4th QTR FY 02 AND 1st QTR FY 03

WHAT IS THIS DOCUMENT?

CTC Trends, CMTC contains observations and associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for two quarters (4QFY02 and 1QFY03). The CALL Lessons Learned Division, CTC Branch, collects these observations and TTP from the respective Observer/Controller (O/C) teams and compiles them in this publication every 6 months. Organized by the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS), the trends reflect both *Positive Performance* and *Needs Emphasis* observations based on quarterly assessments. Trends and TTP from CMTC's Leader Training Program (LTP) and senior NCOs are included when available.

WHO IS THE DOCUMENT FOR?

CTC Trends, CMTC is for tactical field units to use as a reference for training emphasis at home station, in preparation for their next CMTC rotation.

CTC Trends, CMTC is for TRADOC doctrine writers to identify successful techniques and procedures to include in updates of doctrinal publications.

CTC Trends, CMTC is for CTC Operations Groups to use as an historical audit trail of reported observations and TTPs from CMTC.

HOW DO I USE THIS DOCUMENT?

The trends are organized by Battlefield Operating System (BOS).

BOS "index" codes are annotated throughout the document. These codes are based on the battlefield structure and definitions presented in **TRADOC Pam 11-9*, Blueprint of the Battlefield.*** The blueprint provides a common structure of the functions performed by the Army. It serves as a common reference system for analyzing and integrating operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The observations and trends in this publication are at the tactical level. In "T.A.5," for example, the TA refers to the tactical level of war; the number "5" is the Intelligence BOS number. In bold, after each observation, will be an identifier (**HIC, L, MRX)** to annotate the type of rotation that the observation was noted.

HIC=High Intensity Conflict; **L**=Light Rotation; **MRX**=Mission Rehearsal Exercise.

CMTC TRENDS AND TTPs, 4th QTR FY 02 AND 1st QTR FY 03

Organized by BOS, these are the trends submitted by CMTC O/Cs and pulled from take home packages (THPs) and after-action reviews (AARs). As appropriate and/or available, they provide doctrinal references and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the needed training emphasis. Each trend is annotated with *Blueprint of the Battlefield* codes for use in long-term trend analysis.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Exploitation of Captured Enemy Documents (CED).

OBSERVATION (BCT): The brigade combat team (BCT) successfully captured and exploited enemy documents.

DISCUSSION: The BCT captured and exploited a number of enemy documents. These documents provided the S2 with valuable information on enemy plans and intentions. They included two opposing force (OPFOR) battalion fragmentary orders; one company operations order; two maps containing unit graphics, locations, and supply points; two signal operating instructions, and several pages on notes containing the locations and contents of supply points, unit locations, leader names, and call signs. Brigade troops were able to evacuate the CED to the brigade S2 section for exploitation. The supporting tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team logged the CED and provided additional exploitation. The brigade commander and S3 used the intelligence gained from these documents to orient maneuver forces to locate and destroy the enemy.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Enforce use of the captured enemy documents tag described in the unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP).
2. Review chapter 4, **FM 34-52**, ***Intelligence Interrogation.***

(TA.5.1 Collect Information) **L**

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Integration

OBSERVATION (BCT): The staff did not understand how to maximize the IPB process and ISR integration in stability operations.

DISCUSSION: Effective application of the IPB process and ISR integration are challenging in stability operations. The doctrinal processes are valid regardless of the environment. IPB is an iterative process that, in stability and support operations (SASO), enables the commander to visualize and understand the threat and environment. IPB enables the commander to maximize resources at critical points in time and space. ISR integration in SASO places greater reliance on 'boots on the ground' refinement based upon the threat and collection and intelligence targeting. HUMINT serves as the prevalent driver as opposed to sensor-derived intelligence. Subtle changes on the ground in terms of relationships, perceptions, and positions develop slower than the highly visible changes that are made in high intensity conflict scenarios. Analysts must train to rely on soldier patrols as their best sensors instead of the comparatively vast and technologically advanced sensors available to a G2 from higher echelons. Operational initiatives must be synchronized with the information operations (IO), targeting, and information collection processes while maintaining the specificity and integrity necessary to execute these three separate but integrally interrelated processes. IO, ISR, and the concept of operations must be synchronized doctrinally through the IPB and wargaming functions of the military decision-making process (MDMP). A continuous running estimate and predictive analysis cycle must be supported by assessments made by soldiers who understand their role in providing feedback to these processes with an understanding that the named areas of interest (NAIs) are threats to initiatives. The linkage between IPB, IO, ISR integration, and deliberate operations is not adequately supported in SASO due to a tendency to consolidate these processes rather than synchronize and integrate these critical processes. These processes all require continuous improvement and refinement, and in SASO the most malleable and susceptible factors in the area of operations are most likely to be reported by soldiers in muddy boots.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Review Chapter 8, **FM 3-90.3**, ***The Mounted Brigade Combat Team***, NOV 2001.
2. Review **FM 34-7, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support in Stability and Support Operations***, final draft, APR 2000.
3. Review **FM 3-07**, ***Stability Operations and Support Operations*** (DRAG), 1 FEB 2002.

(TA.5.2 Process Information) **MRX**

TREND 2

Subject: Processing Information Using All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L)

OBSERVATION (BCT): The G2 must establish a standard operating procedure for data entries into ASAS-L to maximize the usefulness of the database.

DISCUSSION: ASAS-L is a powerful tool now available to the USAREUR intelligence community. With the fielding of the SASO version of the software, the G2 can now digitally manage volumes of information. The relevance of the database is reliant upon the quality of input. If the data entries do not include all relevant fields (who, what, when, and where at a minimum), the database will be of little value. In many cases, fields contain only partial entries; for example, graffiti in a village, anti-ethnic

sentiments, and change in movement patterns. Without sufficient data, analysts are unable to perform queries and manipulate the data using link analysis and time-event analysis matrices. Additional information such as the time discovered, theme of the graffiti or sentiment, and exact locations would facilitate relevant analysis. Additionally, units enter data into separate unit and section folders rather than brigade standard files. This further complicates data retrieval. When employed improperly, this system impedes development of common operational picture (COP) processes and the resultant situational understanding. This intelligence system must be applied to support development of COPs through further refined data and processes that integrate observations made by GS assets in sector. GS observations that do not provide direct feedback to S2s or analysis and control teams such as civil affairs (CA) teams, psychological operations (PSYOPS), joint military commissions/affairs (JMC/JMA), political advisors (POLADs), and operational reserves must be integrated into development of the COP.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Define the vision for ASAS-L. What do we want to do with the database six months from now, two to five years from now? This will drive how we input data today.
2. Publish an SOP that defines data entry requirements and protocols.

(TA.5.1.1 Processing Information) **MRX**

TREND 3

Subject: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning and Execution.

OBSERVATION (BCT): ISR planning and execution throughout the depth of the brigade's area of operations and the use of all available collection assets was not effective.

DISCUSSION: The brigade's ISR planning did not focus all available assets on information requirements throughout the brigade's area of operations. While the ISR plan adequately addressed requirements in the brigade's deep area of operations, little effort was focused on the OPFOR threat in the brigade's rear area. As the brigade expands the lodgment and extends its lines of communication, it became increasingly susceptible to interdiction by forces in the OPFOR disruption zone. Consequently, contact with the OPFOR in the brigade's rear area was more from coincidence than based on an integrated ISR plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The R&S plan must address the brigade's entire area of operations.
2. Review **FM 34-2-1,** ***Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counter-reconnaissance***.

(TA.5.1 Collect Information) **L**

TREND 4

Subject: Ineffective Reconnaissance and Security (R&S) Plan for the Brigade Support Area (BSA)

OBSERVATION: Poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and integration of analysis from the brigade S2 led to an ineffective R&S plan for the BSA.

DISCUSSION: The logistics TF tactical operations center (TOC) did not incorporate brigade products from the IPB into the planning process and development of the BSA R&S plan. The brigade and battalion staff did not fully understand the impact of the transition from expanding the lodgment itself to commencing combat operations outside the lodgment. Once combat units move their base of operation outside the lodgment, the R&S plan for the lodgment becomes the R&S plan for the BSA. In doing so, the R&S plan for the BSA must focus on high-speed avenues of approach and restrictive terrain that allows for good covered and concealed routes of ingress to put eyes on the BSA and its activities.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

The BSA operations center must incorporate the initial brigade IPB products to identify these areas and develop a set of NAIs and develop a tasking matrix to support adequate reconnaissance and security of those known NAIs by using listening/observation posts (LP/OPs), or mounted or dismounted patrols. Once this is done, it is merely a system of putting resources against the requirements to secure or put eyes on these areas to prevent the enemy elements from interdicting airflow or ground lines of communications (GLOC) operations in support of the combat forces. This in turn allows the BDE commander maximum flexibility by retaining the logistics initiative.

Contemporary Operational Environment (COE): The new COE impacts on this problem further by vastly expanding the considerations for security of a BSA. The BDE and the BSA must ensure a common operating picture exists between them to ensure continuity of the R&S effort in the rear area. The COE, with its opposing force of independent operators of conventional reconnaissance elements and unconventional special purpose forces (SPF) and terrorists, as well as friendly and hostile civilians on the battlefield, ever increases the threat scenarios that the BDE / BSA must be prepared for. The BDE S3/S2 and the BSA S2/3 must ensure that the reconnaissance, surveillance, and security requirements are met and must also ensure that the soldiers understand the ROE for dealing with both friendly and hostile civilians operating around the BSA area. The S2/3 must prepare a plan that considers threats from conventional combat forces and unconventional SPF, terrorist elements, and civilians operating in the rear area. Thus the S2/3 must develop an R&S plan that focuses on the full range of scenarios that could impact the BSA, LRP, ambulance exchange point (AXP), and maintenance collection point (MCP) locations, then allocate and request the resources to execute the plan. The R&S plan must incorporate both active and passive measures such as LP/OPs, R&S patrols capable of monitoring NAIs and zones around the BSA in order to provide the BSA commander the ability to anticipate and decisively respond to any and all threats to the BSA. The support battalion must aggressively plan and execute an R&S plan in

conjunction with the full support of the brigade to ensure uninterrupted anticipatory logistics.

(TA.5.1.1.1 Collect Threat Information) **L**

TREND 5

Subject: Application of Doctrinal ISR Planning and Controlling Measures Outlined in ARTEP 71-3-MTP

OBSERVATION (BCT): BCTs are not applying doctrinal ISR planning and controlling measures outlined in ARTEP 71-3-MTP.

DISCUSSION: BCT ISR planning typically does not support synchronized ISR operations. In many cases, BCTs do not designate an ISR planning team. The resultant shortcomings impact battle command, BCT synchronization, and execution of decisive, shaping and sustaining operations. (1) NAIs are rarely incorporated into an event template. (2) Often, there is no system that tracks and updates the ISR plan in terms of answering priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), clearing NAIs or adjusting the priorities of assets forward. (3) ISR plans are rarely synchronized with higher and adjacent units. (4) The concept of an intelligence handover line within the brigade is rarely addressed and ill defined. (5) There are insufficient ISR assets allocated to NAIs used during all phases of operations, particularly in the brigade rear area. (6) Attached intelligence, chemical recon, and air defense artillery (ADA) radar assets are rarely fully incorporated into the BCT scheme of maneuver, and are not given appropriate missions based on unit capabilities. (7) ISR leaders are challenged to clearly articulate NAIs, identify task and purpose for each NAI, build in the necessary targets, primary and alternate observers, and provide NAI redundancy supported by a clear focus and priority for the collection effort. (8) BCTs are reluctant to designate a "chief of recon" to track, manage, and execute ISR assets in support of the commander's intent and decision support matrix (DSM). This critical element must execute a running estimate that supports the deliberate maneuver of BCT ISR assets and task force scouts to meet the most critical PIRs and tactical and technical trigger requirements. This approach must support an ISR architecture that achieves situational understanding by fusing observation, collection and reporting between divisional and flank units, brigade ISR assets and TF scouts, and operations and intelligence (O&I) reporting processes.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The BCT staffs must fully execute ISR planning and duties. Refer to task number 71-6-1006.17-0BDE "Plan ISR Operations" from **ARTEP 71-3-MTP,** dated 2 SEP 2002 – found at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/query/download/ARTEP+71-3-MTP. Also, refer to **FM 3-90.3,** Chapter 4, "ISR Operations", - found at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/query/download/FM+3-90.3. At the rehearsal, the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) commander, military intelligence (MI) company commander, GS ISR asset leaders, and TF commanders should brief task and purpose, collection objectives for NAIs, and how they intend to cover assigned NAIs to support BCT security and reconnaissance operations. Where applicable, leaders must brief related decision points and triggers associated with these NAIs.

2. ISR planning must designate BCT ISR C^2, priorities, and intent. This C^2 structure must assign officers and NCOs that will be responsible for tracking the reconnaissance mission. Each soldier tracking the situation must be familiar with the mission, priorities, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) for the chief of reconnaissance and the commander. This ISR team must post all reports and status of ISR assets, and validate/update the reconnaissance against current operations and planned operations. The team must understand who the commander has authorized to task ISR assets or change the plan. The ISR team should also develop a graphical tracking method that enables them to see the status of each NAI and determine where there are gaps in coverage that drive changes to current operations.

3. (IAW **FM 34-2-1**, Chapter 7) NAIs should cover the depth of the battle space from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) to the BSA. All soldiers in the BDE can be tasked to conduct reconnaissance. Reconnaissance in the rear becomes particularly important as continuous operations progress, and the COE is fully exercised. Refer to task number 71-6-1007.17-0BDE "Control ISR Operations" from **ARTEP 71-3-MTP** dated 2 SEP 2002 – found at http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/query/download/ARTEP+71-3-MTP.

4. Brigade ISR planning must clearly articulate reconnaissance objectives throughout the depth of the brigade sector, notably within the task force sectors to ensure integration of all brigade recon assets. The chief of recon must be able to reposition any brigade recon asset throughout the area of operations to satisfy the CCIR as the situation changes. The chief of recon and the entire ISR planning team must clearly understand the brigade commander's priority of reconnaissance and NAIs in order to facilitate adjustments based on attrition of recon assets.

5. Phasing reconnaissance assets will effect a transition from static reconnaissance to active reconnaissance. These phases should be enemy-focused and driven by the event template and synchronized within the TOC with maneuver operations. This TTP will assist in prioritizing reconnaissance assets as conflicts between obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) requirements, observer requirements for fire support technical and tactical triggers, and operational intelligence.

6. Attaching all ISR assets to the BRT commander does not achieve synchronization requirements. This trend often results in an unsupportable span of control and diffuses capabilities of specialized individual collectors, as all collectors become de facto scouts with a narrowed focus. The parallel trend of placing these assets under the control of the direct support (DS) battalion or fire support officer (FSO) has the same impact as all ISR assets become de facto fire support observers. The better solution is a deliberate planning process that produces detailed C^2 and collection requirements to ensure accomplishment of the most critical ISR tasks that support the commander's decisive operation and CCIR.

(TA.5.1 Collect Information) **HIC**

TREND 6
Subject: Use of Engineer Reconnaissance Teams (ERTs)

OBSERVATION (BCT): Units habitually task organize an ERT with the TF scout platoon to provide subject matter expertise to the reconnaissance effort for the collection of obstacle intelligence. However, ERTs are not organized, equipped or trained to function as a recon team and routinely are used to fill personnel shortages in the scout teams.

DISCUSSION: ERTs are not military table of organization and equipment (MTOE)-supported organizations and therefore the personnel required to man them is taken out of hide from one of the line engineer squads in the supporting engineer company. Often, the company resources this requirement with two or three junior enlisted soldiers (military occupational specialty 12B10/20 MOS) These soldiers do not have the experience in either reconnaissance or obstacle reduction to qualify as countermobility subject matter experts (SMEs) and are not routinely equipped or trained to function as a recon team. These personnel are usually merged into the scout platoon, filling holes in various scout teams such as radiotelephone operators or additional dismounted security personnel. Therefore, while the task force and brigade leadership may think there is a viable ERT focused on gathering OBSTINTEL, this is not routinely ground truth. Regardless of who is ultimately assigned the OBSTINTEL reconnaissance task, TF staffs rarely provide the PIR-SIR-SOR (specific information requirements, specific orders and requests) linkage in the R&S plan that provides the OBSTINTEL to support the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Reconnaissance is primarily a 19D MOS task and this specialty is trained to perform obstacle reconnaissance. **FM 17-98,** (APR 1999) clearly specifies the method to be used by scouts when conducting obstacle reconnaissance:

> *Once security is established, scouts then move dismounted to the obstacle. The scouts must be cautious when reconnoitering the obstacle. Tripwires or other signs may indicate the enemy is using booby traps or command-detonated mines to prevent friendly forces from determining pertinent information about the obstacle, known as OBSTINTEL. The scout platoon must collect all information that may be critical to the commander in such areas as planning a breach and verifying the enemy template. Examples of OBSTINTEL include:*
>
> - *Obstacle location.*
> - *Obstacle orientation.*
> - *Soil conditions.*
> - *Presence of wire, gaps, and bypasses.*
> - *Composition of complex obstacles.*
> - *Minefield composition, including types of mines.*
> - *Breaching requirements.*
> - *Gaps between successive obstacle belts.*

- *Location of enemy direct fire weapons.*

The scout element reconnoitering the obstacle prepares an obstacle report with this information and forwards the report through the platoon leader or PSG to the commander.

2. TF Scouts should conduct additional qualification training in the area of mobility reconnaissance. Identifying obstacles remains a primary 19D task that receives less emphasis if the brigade and task force focus shifts all mobility reconnaissance to engineer reconnaissance teams. Instead of compensating for the lack of skills, task forces should train to standard and utilize the broad spectrum of 19D qualifications such as bridge and road classification.

3. Task forces are successful when the reconnaissance effort is directed and controlled at the TF level, and tied into an overall TF R&S plan to facilitate coordination on the battlefield. There are several keys to successful reconnaissance and surveillance planning. (**CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 99-14,** OCT 99 – ***Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Planning and Execution)*** They include:

- Having a clear commander's intent and well-defined PIRs.
- Conducting a proper IPB.
- Developing good enemy situational templates and event templates.
- Issuing a well-planned and coordinated R&S order (overlay and matrix).
- Deploying R&S forces early.
- Providing continuous coverage throughout the depth of the battlefield.
- Using all possible assets.
- Providing timely and accurate reports to the commander.

4. When a task force uses an ERT, the TF R&S plan can exploit the following ERT capabilities:

- Increasing the supporting unit's recon capability concerning complex mine and wire obstacle systems, enemy engineer activities, and details of mobility along a route.
- Providing detailed technical information on any encountered obstacle.
- Conducting an analysis of what assets will be needed to reduce any encountered obstacle.
- Marking bypasses of obstacles based on guidance from the supported commander. *This guidance includes whether to mark bypasses and in which direction the force should maneuver when bypassing an obstacle.*
- Providing detailed technical information on routes (including classification) and specific information on any bridges, tunnels, fords, and ferries along the route.
- Assisting in acquiring enemy engineer equipment on the battlefield.
- Assisting in guiding the breach force to the obstacle to be reduced

5. If employed, the ERT should be similarly equipped as the scouts with whom they will be operating. This should include vehicles and communication platforms, night-vision

devices (NVDs), etc., in order for the team to be self-sufficient. In addition, the ERTs must deploy with graphics, maps, reporting matrices, and a communication plan coordinated with other reconnaissance assets. They should be specially trained for the mission so they understand the basic principles of reconnaissance and cross-FLOT (forward line of own troops) operations so they have the necessary training to do their job and survive in a wholly different environment than most engineers normally operate under.

(TA.5.1 Collect Information) **HIC**

MANUEVER BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1
Subject: Use of Topographic (Terrain) Team

OBSERVATION (BCT): The engineer battalion (EN BN) incorporated a topographic detachment as part of their battalion TOC. The detachment was thoroughly integrated and produced a great number of very useful topographic products for customers throughout the brigade.

DISCUSSION: The EN BN incorporated a topographic detachment as part of their battalion TOC, and the team proved to be a powerful combat multiplier. The team produced products for the BRT, the FSO, S2, S6, S3, subordinate infantry battalions, the deputy brigade commander, and the brigade commander. The topographic detachment used both the Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS) and commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) software (e.g. – Earth Resources Data Analysis System (ERDAS) *Imagine*). Products included the following:

- Visual "fly-bys": This feature allows the user to simulate flying a specified route at a specified elevation, allowing users to see the routes they will take before using them.
- Slope Maps: This product identifies areas where the slope exceeds parameters assigned by the user. Users can identify areas, which are suitable for positioning and firing artillery, as well as develop products that are useful for determining trafficability during IPB.
- Weapons Fans: Weapons fans are extremely useful and versatile tools for all BOSs to identify enemy and friendly battle positions, template obstacle locations and determine ambush sites.
- Lines of Sight (LOS): The LOS creates a profile view of the terrain from the observer's location to a target. Green lines show what the observer can see; red lines show what he cannot see (dead space). The LOS can also display the Fresnel zones of different radio frequencies. *(The Fresnel zone is defined as an area of propagation (ellipsoid in shape) that exists between microwave transmitting and receiving antennas in which no obstacles should be located to establish reliable communications.)*

- Special Products: The special products included a variety of maps with graphics at varying scales. The array of special products were up to the imagination of the requester, but included "blow-ups" of urban areas using controlled image base (CIB) imagery, and to-scale maneuver graphics printed on acetate.

The brigade staff became dependent on the team for the quality products provided during both planning and execution and their contribution to the brigade combat team cannot be overstated.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Engineer battalions should continue to request topographic team support for CTC rotations. Coordination must be done well in advance, as the topographic teams are division and corps level assets.
2. Engineer planners must be aware of the range of products available that topographic teams can provide. Engineer planners typically must also introduce brigade staff planners to the variety of products available. The best reference currently available is **FM 3-34.230**, ***Topographic Operations***. Once users see available products, and how the products enhance planning and execution, the demand for those products will likely increase significantly.

(TA.1.1.2 Negotiate Terrain) **L**

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1
Subject: Tactical Assembly Area Procedures

OBSERVATION (BCT): CO/TMs are challenged with the execution of TAA occupation procedures and priorities of work.

DISCUSSION: CO/TMs are having difficulty with the preparation, occupation, and departure from tactical assembly areas (TAAs). The problem normally starts with the quartering party and initial recon of the TAA by the company XO/1SG. Units are not conducting adequate IPB and terrain analysis, which results in poor site selection and inadequate security. Priorities of work are not standardized across the platoons or the company by standing operating procedures (SOP), which routinely impacts planning and preparation for combat operations. Additionally, the company command post lacks tracking systems, which greatly effect time management and limits situational awareness. Furthermore, the lack of standardization is critically evident during departure from the TAA to the line of departure (LD). The CO/TMs do not understand uncoiling procedures from the TAA and the subsequent impact on mission execution. This is a time sensitive process that requires a detailed SOP and extensive rehearsals during all periods of visibility.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop and implement a viable company/platoon SOP
2. Review **FM 71-1**, **(FM 3-90.1)** ***The Tank and Mechanized infantry Company Team***, Appendix B.

3. Develop tracking systems that focus on priorities of work

Train the uncoiling via the rehearsal continuum (crawl/walk/run, reduced force to full force) at home station. The Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) does allow, with some restrictions, the unit to rehearse the uncoiling process.

(TA.1.3.2 Occupy Terrain) **HIC**

TREND 2

Subject: CO/TM Rehearsals, Utilizing a Terrain Model

OBSERVATION (BCT): Units are challenged to conduct company/team rehearsals (terrain model) to standard.

DISCUSSION: Units are challenged to conduct a viable rehearsal. Despite an emphasis to conduct mounted rehearsals prior to each mission, CO/TMs lack situational awareness and do not have complete understanding of the commander's plan due to inadequate terrain model rehearsals prior to the mounted rehearsal. The terrain model routinely lacks detail (graphic control measures and terrain) due to the inexperience of the soldiers of whose job it is to construct them, combined with a lack of supervision. Furthermore, the rehearsal process is sometimes flawed due to the absence of an SOP. For example, some rehearsals do not have an agenda, response sequence, key event by phase to focus participants, nor do they address the seven forms of contact or feature a role-player to play the enemy. The result is a concept brief by the commander to his subordinates and a lack of synchronization for the different assets assigned/attached to the CO/TM (FSO, CASEVAC personnel, engineers, chemical assets, ADA, etc).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Develop a rehearsal SOP based on rehearsal types and techniques. Particular emphasis should be placed on generic (battle drills), mounted (actions on contact, breaching, etc), and terrain model rehearsals.
2. Recommend that the company XO both facilitate the rehearsal and role-play the enemy. The commander should be seen and only heard at critical decision points and can address key issues that require clarification.

Review **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5**, MAR 98, ***Rehearsals***, and **FM 71-1**, ***The Tank and Mechanized infantry Company Team***, pg. 2-39 to 2-41. (**FM 3-90.1)**

(TA.1.1.1.1 Prepare for Movement) **HIC**

TREND 3

Subject: Command Post Displacement

OBSERVATION (BCT): An emerging trend is the inability of the TF main command post (CP) to properly displace.

DISCUSSION: The main CP routinely does not have sufficient cargo and personnel space on its assigned vehicles to displace without making multiple turns because of poor load plans, over-manning, and an overabundance of support equipment. Routinely, this causes TF main command posts into one of two coping strategies. Under the first strategy, the TF main CP echelons itself into two distinct elements: (1) the TOC,

comprised of the habitual M577 armored command post vehicles, and (2) a trains element comprised of support vehicles such as M981 5-ton trucks and M998 HMMWVs. Under the second strategy, the TF CP caches its support element in a hide site or at a previous position and then jumps the armored TOC element forward to maintain communication for the mission. Following the mission, the armored TOC element returns to the cache site where it rejoins its support element. Both of these coping strategies are based on unrealistic assumptions or expectations in combat, particularly during fast-paced offensive operations. Support vehicles transport equipment and personnel that are required to maintain 24-hour command post operations. While METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, civilians) considerations may require temporary echeloning of the command post, these periods should be limited.

Due to the rapid nature of combat operations, a task force must be able to transition quickly from fighting one engagement to planning, then executing a branch or sequel engagement. Application of either of the above coping strategies under this trend often results in the unexpected second-order effect of separating the TF staff from critical planning, automation, and reproduction assets upon receipt of a new mission — severely handicapping them at the onset of the MDMP.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Task forces should stay within their assigned personnel and vehicle MTOE structures. Units should have vehicle battle rosters that match personnel faces with vehicle spaces, factoring in safety concerns, such as seat belts. CPs should be able to safely transport all personnel in one element.

2. Due to the singular and unique nature of each vehicle at the main CP, task forces should have specific vehicle load plans for each vehicle. Load plans must accommodate wartime considerations such as class V (munitions) and class IV (barrier material). The CP should be able to transport all MTOE equipment in one lift.

3. Task force command post vehicles must be maintained at a high state of readiness since their loss is not easily transferred to another asset. TF maintenance priorities must include command and control assets. Additionally, operations sergeants major (SGM) must develop contingency plans for the loss of one or more of the main CP vehicles and a "bump" plan for key equipment, such as communication and automation equipment. TF XOs can assist by re-prioritizing limited task force cargo capacities in coordination with the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commander.

4. Units should train to **ARTEP 71-2 MTP** standards on command post displacement using Task 07-1-5207, Transfer Command and Control Functions During Displacement of the Command Post.

5. Units should consider command and control concerns during MDMP in order to synchronize main command post displacements. Operations SGMs and XOs should determine at what point CPs go to a green, amber or red configuration based on events. Additionally, TF signal officers must analyze frequency modulation (FM) line of sight and, in coordination with operations SGMs, plan how, when, and to where the main CP will displace.

6. Task force operations SGMs should ensure that the all CP personnel receive an operations order that specifies the TOC's plan during mission execution and timeline for movement.

(TA.1.1.1 Position/Reposition Forces [Units and Equipment]) **HIC**

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

Positive Performance

TREND 1
Subject: Integrating Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) Elements into the Information Operations (IO) Campaign

OBSERVATION: The MNB (E) fire support element worked hard to include the multi-national units into the information operations process.

DISCUSSION: The fire support element (FSE)/chief of effects consistently pushed to ensure that multinational forces were integrated as part of the targeting process. The FSE produced multilingual soldier talking-point cards for the multinational units. The result was that IO themes and messages went to every soldier, not just US soldiers, in every language, in accordance with (IAW) the commander's intent. The chief of effects also requested and received target refinement from the multinational units.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Sustain current processes. **FM 100-8**, ***The Army in Multinational Operations,*** states synchronization is key to effective tactical fire support in a multinational environment. The military field commander must organize his staff to ensure the fire support element can synchronize the fire support capabilities of all friendly forces.

(TA.2.2.2.1.2 Conduct Battlefield Psychological Activities) **MRX**

TREND 2
Subject: XO/S3 Involvement in the Information Operations Process

Observation: The TF executive officer is the right person to serve as the synchronizer of the FSO, S5, S2 and S3 plans in support of TF level targeting.

DISCUSSION: At the beginning of the MRX, the TF XO should assume the duty of chief of IO with the information operations information officer (IOIO)/S5, S2, and S3 planner. The TF XO should be involved in IO planning and development of the IO concept of support. The IOIO should chair the IO targeting meeting and serve as a catalyst to make IO recommendations to the command group that would be essential to mission accomplishment of the heavy TF. Through a developed IO battle rhythm embedded into the operational battle rhythm, the battle staff/BOS presence and their synchronized involvement, the TF battle staff (XO, S3 planner, S2, and IOIO) should be able to focus more quickly and reallocate GS IO assets and resources. The presence of a field grade officer only enhances the legitimacy of the IO battle staff and ensures a better chance of the IO plan being nested more effectively into the tactical operations of the task force.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

The TF XO/S3 serves as the commander's action agent to ensure staff synchronization. The unit should maintain this TTP. Ref: **FM 101-5**, **(FM 6-0)** ***Staff Organization and Operations***, Chapter 4.

(TA.2.2.2.1.2 Conduct Battlefield Psychological Activities) **MRX**

TREND 3

Subject: Facilitating Clearance of Fires through Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs)

Observation: The brigade FSE continually improved its ability to track and update FSCMs.

DISCUSSION: The brigade FSE improved its situational awareness through the use of FSCMs to facilitate the clearance of fires. Awareness of small unit locations forward of the FLOT and/or beyond the coordinated fire line (CFL) greatly improved the FSE's ability to rapidly clear indirect fires. This function included knowing locations of such elements as reconnaissance teams, ground surveillance radar (GSR) teams, retransmissions (RETRANS) sections, and battalion scout teams, as well as the tracking of their movement.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. The BDE FSE should continue to train subordinate units on the usage of FSCMs to facilitate clearance of fires.
2. Develop standard no fire/restricted fire area (NFA/RFA) naming conventions within the BDE SOP to clearly identify which elements requested the establishment of NFAs/RFAs.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support) **L**

TREND 4

Subject: Combined ISR/Fire Support Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (BCT): The brigade developed and executed a TTP that incorporated the rehearsal of reconnaissance elements and the execution of the fire plan. This TTP proved a powerful methodology which ensured a focus on the linkage between PIR and essential fire support tasks (EFST) / high payoff targets (HPTs), and synchronized the passing of targets from named to target areas of interest (NAIs to TAIs) in the execution of brigade fires.

DISCUSSION: Participation by all target acquisition system representatives to include chemical recon, electronic acquisition, BRT and TF scouts ensures a common understanding of the fire plan and responsibilities for the execution of EFSTs. Areas to improve in the execution of this task are better incorporation of field artillery radar acquisition, HPT / EFST target handover from BCT to TF level reconnaissance, and the incorporation of company fire support teams (FIST) as part of the target acquisition

process. (**ARTEP 6-037-30-MTP** Task: Participate In Fire Support Rehearsal Operations (06-1-A039))**:**

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. Field artillery radar representatives should brief location, task, purpose, coverage, and movement triggers during execution of the rehearsal to ensure that radar coverage is available with organic assets or coverage has been requested during movement to ensure coverage during critical events.

2. Each participant must rehearse target handover procedures prior to execution. The BCT observer must know whom he reports to, the radio net he reports on, and the BCT FSO must ensure that the BCT observer is linked to the TF FSO. The BCT FSO accomplishes this to ensure that handover has taken place and that there is no loss of contact as the target is passed down to the TF FSO. The TF FSO can then alert company FSOs as to the target entering their sector and ensure contact is not lost.

3. A sample agenda for an ISR / fire support rehearsal:

Step 1. Ground Rules

- Take roll call
- Ensure a recorder is ready
- State the agenda
- Orient participants to a terrain board or map
- Designate what events will be rehearsed
- Update both friendly and enemy activities since the issuance of the order

Step 2. Deploy Enemy Forces

Step 3. Deploy Friendly Forces — The observation plan should address where the observer needs to be, security, communications, how the observer gets into position, what the observer is to accomplish, and disengagement criteria if necessary (IAW Para 3-48 of **FM 3-09.4**, ***TTP for Fire Support for Brigade Operations)***. A TTP to assist developing the observation plan for ISR and fire support is working from the NAI /target back to the supporting OP(s). The first step is to determine what report the BCT commander wants back from an observer at an NAI or what effect the BCT commander wants to have on a target. The XO or S2 can then advise the commander if a decision needs to be made based on PIR or the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) / FSO can advise the commander on what type of effect could best be accomplished at a TAI. Once the BRT / TFs have sub-assigned NAIs, TAIs, and targets, and synchronized movement with their scheme of maneuver, then they should provide refined observer positions. The BCT must then reduce observer redundancy, when necessary, and refine the observation plan to ensure critical NAIs / targets have a minimum of two observers and are positioned outside of target effects. During the ISR / fire support rehearsal, the BCT will verify or adjust OP positions to account for observer losses to ensure EFST / HPT coverage and then rehearse target clearance to enable rapid attack. Finally, reconnaissance asset leaders should brief limited visibility OPs as well as the results of limited visibility PCIs.

Step 4. Brigade Mission and Concept of the Operation

Step 5. Critical Events

- Offense (reconnaissance, breaching operations, attack to defeat, defeat of counter- attacking force)
- Defense (enemy movement into sector, counterreconnaissance, defeat of each echelon)

Within each critical event, the following should be addressed:

- Enemy situation (S2)
- Brigade concept (S3)
- NAIs / PIR / HPTs (S2)
- EFSTs (FSO)
- Collection Plan ―Analysis and control team (ACT) / fire support execution matrix (FSO)
    - BRT (location, task, purpose, NAI, TAI, PIR, EFST, intelligence / target handover)
    - COLT (location, task, purpose, NAI, TAI, PIR, EFST, intelligence / target handover)
    - TF scouts (location, task, purpose, NAI, TAI, PIR, EFST, intelligence / target handover)
    - Company FIST (location, task, purpose, NAI, TAI, PIR, EFST, intelligence / target handover)
    - Radars (location, task, purpose, coverage plan, cueing and movement triggers)

- Issue fire orders and messages to observers (direct support battalion FDO / mortar platoon leader). This ensures attack guidance is met and delivery systems are positioned to support the plan.

Step 6. Decision Points

Step 7. Branch Plans

Step 8. Follow-up and Review of Issues

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support) **HIC**

<u>Needs Emphasis</u>

<u>TREND 1</u>

Subject: Effective Use of Spheres of Influence as a Tool to Decide Delivery Means for Targeting

OBSERVATION: Units are generally failing to establish spheres of influence when dealing with civil authorities.

DISCUSSION: Units normally are not establishing procedures or protocols for access to local civil authorities or describing access conditions. This causes an environment where every soldier on the ground feels it is permissible to discuss issues

with the local government officials at any time of the day. Stability and support and operations require careful management of key contacts within the local governments (mayor, police chief, etc). Otherwise, possible IO fratricide may occur. It is essential to plan the interaction with these key contacts as part of the operation and ensure to synchronize it with the overall scheme.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should develop spheres of influence to deal with civil authorities. Subordinate units must also fully understand the IO scheme and receive specific delivery tasking during their day-to-day interactions with the local government officials.

(TA.2.2.2.1.2. Conduct Battlefield Psychological Activities) **MRX**



TREND 2

Subject: Planning Communications Nodes Across the Area of Responsibility (AOR) for *Bright Sky* or Radar Missions

OBSERVATION (BCT): When planning *Bright Sky* or radar missions, the FSE is not utilizing the terrain tools necessary to ensure communications from point to point for as many as five communications nodes across the MNB (E) AOR.

DISCUSSION: Failing to use available communications technology often results in ineffective positioning of battery RETRANS assets and an inability to communicate.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

With the loss of the FA battalion staff structure, the FSE, some other staff structure, or the battery must assume many of the staff planning requirements for the battery. Communications is one of the more important staff planning requirements. The battalion should train several soldiers within the FSE on the use of *TerraBase* / ADOCS (automated deep operations coordination system) to conduct communications LOS analysis. This should ease planning requirements at the battery level and ensure the battery maintains communications throughout the time the battery is deployed in support of fires delivery or radar support. See **ARTEP 6-115-MTP**, task: Develop the Battalion Communications Plan (06-1-A014).

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support) **MRX**

TREND 3

Subject: G2 / G3 Integration Into The Targeting Working Group and Decision Brief

OBSERVATION: The targeting working group (TWG) and decision brief do not have the necessary input from the G2 or G3.

DISCUSSION: The G3 representatives are not bringing the current operations plan to the TWG meeting in order to ensure that the targeting supported current operations. The G2 is not narrowing the focus of targeting to high value targets (HVTs), rather only briefing upcoming significant events and a list of previous activity without assessing it. The result is that targeting is conducted in the absence of operational focus. Also, the overall tasking of assets, GS or TF, is not synchronized with the other competing demands of the brigade. The scheme of fires is not supporting the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Each member of the targeting working group needs to understand what they must bring to the meeting to ensure the right audience is targeted to support ongoing operations.
2. The G3 needs to know the focus of operations and the G2 needs to bring in the list of HVTs, which can be turned into HPTs during the conduct of the working group.
3. IAW **FM 101-5, (FM 6-0)** ***Staff Organization and Operations,*** Chapter 4, the G3 is responsible for synchronizing tactical operations with all staff sections. The G3 must participate in the targeting working group to ensure targeting supports the commander's intent. In the absence of the commander, the G3 must be prepared to relay the commander's intent and synchronize fires IAW the operational intent.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support) **MRX**

TREND 4
Subject: Integrating Information Operations SOP into the TF tactical SOP (TACSOP)

OBSERVATION: Lack of an initial Information Operations SOP (integrated into the TACSOP) severely hindered the IO planning and targeting process.

DISCUSSION: During the initial planning phase, it is apparent that the FSOs at both TF and company/troop level do not know what is expected of them as far as products and tools are concerned. It takes a great deal of effort at the TF level to develop the formats and matrices that will eventually be used in the IO process. Additionally, the debriefing and assessment process is not understood. Standard terminology and information flow between MNB (E) and the other task forces is lacking.

TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES:
1. Using the lessons learned during the FTX and **FM 3-13** (**100-6**) ***Information Operations***, the FSOs should develop a common IO SOP for the TF. It should include common products and processes for daily operations, and standards for information flow between the various headquarters elements within the BDE. The first step to proper execution of a plan is getting everyone on the "same sheet of music".

(TA.2.2.2.1.2 Conduct Battlefield Psychological Operations) **MRX**

TREND 5
Subject: Developing Tactical Measures of Effectiveness

OBSERVATION (BCT): The FSE utilized campaign measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and issued these MOEs to separate TFs as a means of determining tactical success in the attack of assigned targets.

***DISCUSSION*:** As these MOEs were campaign focused, they rarely had any direct bearing on providing a gauge with which to assess the success or failure for the attack of a target. In most cases, the act of delivery (level of effort) was considered as target success not whether or not there was any effect on the target. The TF FSEs and TF FSEs consistently improved in this area.

***TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES*:**
Units should develop target-specific MOEs that use subjective or objective criteria with which to gauge target success based on the desired end state. The ability to gauge target success is what is important. While the campaign MOEs may allow the commander to gauge the overall environment, they do not provide a gauge of tactical target execution success. The targeting working group must determine the desired end state (effects) required for each target and then establish meaningful MOEs. **FM 3-13** DRAG states:

Establishing meaningful criteria of success requires understanding the desired end state. Evaluating effects in terms of subjective criteria requires interpreting information that portrays qualitative effects and determining how these effects change over time. (Para E-2)

(TA.2.1.1 Select Target to Attack) **MRX**

TREND 6

Subject: Synchronization of Information Operations Targets with Current Operations

OBSERVATION (BCT): The targeting working group often had no forum in which the Chief of Effects could synchronize targets with overall Task Force operations.

DISCUSSION: Although the target working group is well organized and well run according to current MNB (E) SOPs and TTPs, it often has no forum in which the chief of effects can synchronize targets with overall TF operations. The result is that many GS assets are given multiple missions from multiple agencies within the staff without a view as to the feasibility of using that asset to resource a target. For example, the tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) (x4) have sourcing and supporting missions for over 38 targets. Also, TFs are given a mission to decide, detect, deliver, or assess without any analysis of their ongoing operations or how many targets they can execute in a 30 day cycle. Ultimately, the target cycle is not focused in support of ongoing operations and there is no ability to track the feasibility of attacking a target with any given resource. Therefore, the scheme of fires does not necessarily support the scheme of maneuver.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. **FM 3-13**, ***Information Operations TTPs***, DRAG (Appendix E paragraph E-1) states that:

Targeting is a logical process that **synchronizes lethal and nonlethal fires with the effects of other battlefield operating systems**. It is an integral part of Army operations. Based on the commander's targeting guidance and targeting objectives, the targeting team determines what targets to attack and how, where, and when to attack them. It then assigns targets to systems best suited to achieve the desired effects. **The chief of staff/executive officer leads the targeting team. Fire support, G2, G3, and Air Force representatives form its core.**

Recommend that all TFs conduct a 30-day operational synchronization session (wargame) in which the staff headed by either the chief of staff or the G3 can synchronize all of the actions and operating systems in conjunction with the targeting effort. This will allow the targeting team the opportunity to ensure that the scheme of IO targeting meets the scheme of maneuver and that targeting resources are not over-tasked.

(TA.2. 1.1 Select Target to Attack) **MRX**

TREND 7
Subject: Incorporating Information Operations (IO) into Guard Force Operations

OBSERVATION: Information Operations (IO) was not effectively integrated into Guard Force Operations.

***DISCUSSION*:** The inability of units to incorporate IO into Guard Force Operations has a negative impact, specifically, with controlling civil disturbances. Leaders are not disseminating IO talking points or themes to subordinate elements. As a result, platoon-level leaders do not have the information necessary to negotiate or control civil disturbances. On two separate occasions, demonstrators and hecklers demonstrated their anger concerning a child killed by a U.S. Army vehicle. The on-scene soldiers did not possess the IO themes or talking points that may have helped in defusing the situation. As a result, the unit was unable to negotiate a timely, peaceful end to hostilities.

***TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES*:**

1. Unit leaders must review and ascertain key information from OPORDs and FRAGOs pertaining to IO. Upon receipt of this information, these individuals must analyze and disseminate the information to subordinate elements.

2. Unit's must be able to identify critical events that occur which may require specific IO themes or talking points to appropriately address the situation. If the unit does not receive critical IO guidance through the orders process, it should submit an appropriate Request For Information (RFI) through the chain of command.

3. All units should assign a subordinate member within the chain of command as the IO Officer. This individual will assist the commander in identifying, analyzing, and disseminating critical information pertaining to IO.

(TA.2.2.2.1.2 Conduct Battlefield Psychological Activities) **MRX**

TREND 8
Subject: Developing Effective Essential Fire Support Tasks (EFSTs)

OBSERVATION: Units consistently struggle with properly developing EFSTs tied to high payoff targets (HPTs). EFSTs that are developed, are not developed to the level of detail that identifies clear triggers and the "who, what, where, when, why, and how" of each task. Dismounted forces have difficulty determining proper triggers for mounted forces and during limited visibility.

DISCUSSION: During the establishment of the lodgment, the Brigade Task Force targeting process identified mortars as an HPT. Despite being identified as an HPT, the S-2 and the FDO did not use the available SHELREPs coming from subordinate battalions to plot back-azimuths and modify the S-2's template of the Mortars. The lack of a detailed method in the EFST, to include triggers, observation instructions and tasks

to subordinate units to identify and attack suspected mortar locations, resulted in heavy losses for the Brigade throughout the rotation. Triggers were inadequate to effectively engage moving targets. Further, unplanned, inadequate or poorly understood triggers caused fires not to meet the intent of the task force commander.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: EFSTs must be clearly developed in terms of the task, purpose, method, and effects for a Brigade critical target. "The task describes what targeting objective (delay, disrupt, limit or destroy) fires must achieve on an enemy formation's function or capability. The purpose describes why the task contributes to maneuver. The method describes how the task will be accomplished by assigning responsibility to observers or units and delivery assets and providing amplifying information or restrictions. When possible, specific target numbers and triggers should be included. During wargaming and subsequent rehearsals, specific targets and triggers must be covered in concert with the observer plan for each target. Effects quantify successful accomplishment of the task" (Fire Support Planning for the Brigade and Below, US Army FA School, Ft. SILL, 16 September 1998). Also, see Para 4-18 FM 3-09.31 (TTPs For Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander).

The FSO must develop an observer plan to support his planned targets. The observer must be able to observe the trigger and the target location. He must take into account time, distance, limited visibility and the speed of the target in developing his triggers. Frequently, task force assets such as scouts or infantry dismounts must be utilized or the task force must "piggy- back" off BDE level assets and link their plan to the BDE coverage of NAIs and TAIs by passing targets from the deep fight to the close fight when and where possible. These NAIs and TAIs may very well serve as task force level triggers. For further information, see *CALL No.95-10 p.34-39 "Triggers"* which discusses the planning and execution of indirect fire triggers.

(TA.2.3 *Integrate Fire Support*) **L**

TREND 9

Subject: Fires Responsiveness (ARTEP 6-115-MTP Task: Synchronize Fire Support, 06-1-C097)

OBSERVATION (BCT): The average mission processing time was 9:39 from mission receipt at the TF FSE until the first howitzer reported "shot" (see the figure below). The shortest mission time was 3:00 minutes during the Night Defense and the longest mission time was 27:00 minutes during the Night Attack.

DISCUSSION: The MTP time standard (not including tactical clearance) is 2:30. FM 3-09.4 para 3-02 lists one of the four inherent tasks of a DS Artillery battalion as "support to forces in contact". This support requires **"**responsive FS [fire support] that protects and ensures freedom of maneuver to forces in contact with the enemy. This includes the allocation of weapon systems and sorties to subordinate elements that actually engage the enemy."

There are two primary causes for slow fire mission response: Centralized clearance procedures and centralized target decisions during the course of the battle. Both cause delays as key leaders discuss where to focus fires. The result of time lost

through clearance or decision often equates to lost opportunities. *Example:* During the Night Attack, target clearance was extremely difficult. Communications problems with key leaders in the TOC delayed the decision to initiate a fire mission, despite the fact that forces in contact could talk to the battalion FDC. The result was an average mission processing time of 12:09 with 1/3 of all missions taking in excess of 15 minutes.

BCT Night Defense Fire Mission Times:



TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: FM 3-09.4, 3-09.21 and FM 3-09.31 provide several methods to improve responsiveness:

1. **Conduct Rehearsals**: Combat rehearsals help a unit gain agility, ensure synchronization, increase initiative, and improve depth of knowledge through practice... Rehearsals should both practice and test the plan. This process will refine the decision criteria and promote a common understanding of decisions to shift focus of fires, priorty of fires, and clearance procedures. (FM3-09.4 para 3-94).

2. **Reduce fires clearance decisions to the lowest level:**

(a) **Pre-clear Targets**: A commander may pre-clear fires on a preplanned target, with a definable trigger, against a specific enemy, and according to the concept of fires. (3-09.4 para 3-111)

(b) **Utilize boundaries to separate clearance responsibilities**: If no boundaries are established then the next higher HQ must clear all fires… Whenever possible, boundaries should be used, because they allow the unit which "owns the ground" to engage targets quickly, requiring coordination and clearance only within that organization. (3-09.4 para 3-109)

(c) **Improve use of Automated (AFATDS) Clearance Capabilities:** Reduce the number of "decide" intervention points and use clearly defined Zones of Responsibility (ZORs) in order to pre-clear and add a buffer to a FSCM to account for the effects of fires near the FSCMs

(boundaries) to ensure clearance near the boundary is not slowed because the effects violate the FSCM. (3-09.4 para 3-114)

3. **Shorten the Sensor to Shooter Link:** Reduce Decision Time during Execution using the following TTP (See Appendix E FM 3-09.4)

(a) **Designate a Close Support Battery**: Designate a FA battery to provide immediately responsive fires to lead elements. (3-09.4 para 4-35, additional; TTP in Sept-Oct FA Journal FA Volume VII, No 4).

(b) **Establish Criteria**: Establish Transition Criteria for the shift of Priority of Fires from support to the Concept of Fires (Brigade Fires) to Support to forces in Contact. Provide priority of fires to lead elements. Develop clear decision criteria to shift Priority of Fires to a force in contact to provide immediate responsive fires to a lead observer in contact. (3-09.4 para 4-30).

(c) **Establish a Quick Fire Channel**: A quick fire channel could be established from a FIST, through the Bn FSE, and then directly to the Bn FDC. Or for even faster response and more decentralized control, the FIST may send the mission directly to the BOC or POC that will execute the mission. Any FSE or FA CP that is normally in the fire mission flow, but is bypassed during quick fire operations, should receive a notification of each fire mission. (3-09.21 para 5-02)

(TA.2.1 Process Ground Targets) **MRX**

TREND 10
Subject: Radar Employment Planning

OBSERVATION (BCT): TF FSE lost situation awareness of radar operations several times.

DISCUSSION: The brigade FSE lost situation awareness of radar operations several times. During a 0500 mortar attack, the current operations officer asked the FSE NCOIC how many radars were operational and where they were oriented. The NCOIC could not answer the question. In most cases, whenever the TPS personnel were not present in the FSE, there was no one who knew the status of the radar and certainly no one to conduct the zone and predictive analysis should a question of crisis arise.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Based on the reduction of TPS manning within the MNB, cross-train the soldiers, NCOs, and officers within the FSE to understand radar operations, to read a posted Radar Deployment Order (RDO), and to conduct counter-fire predictive analysis. Also, develop and use some form of radar tracking display / chart that will allow an FSE soldier to gain instant knowledge of radar operations in the MNB (E) sector. Finally, implement a standard shift change briefing that includes radar operations as an agenda item. See ARTEP 6-115-MTP, task CONTROL COUNTERFIRE OPERATIONS (06-1-W100),

and DIRECT THE OPERATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY ACQUISITION ASSETS (06-1-A009)

(TA.2.2.2.2.2 *Counter Target Acquisition Systems*) **MRX**

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Needs Emphasis:

TREND 1
Subject: Integration and Utilization of GS Assets

OBSERVATION (BCT): Division GS assets available for conducting Information Operations missions were poorly integrated into the TF Information Operations targeting plan. GS asset integration and coordination was a problem at all levels. For example, while operating in one TF sector and crossing into another, GS assets frequently fail to coordinate horizontally with the TF whose sector they were entering.

DISCUSSION: The TF commander made GS assets such as public affairs (PA), civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and military police (MP) available to support task force operations. The task force staffs often made little coordination with these assets, failed to include them in the MDMP and targeting processes, and conducted no rehearsals specifically addressing their role in the TF IO targeting plan. Frequently, GS assets operating in one task force sector moved into adjacent sectors without coordination or adequate situational awareness. This resulted in cases of "IO Fratricide," and created the potential to have small GS teams victimized by hostile elements without adequate maneuver support. Additionally, task forces made little attempt to track target engagement by these assets, and did not implement systematic debriefing procedures to provide feedback on IO target engagements, and IO relevant observations in the AO. GS IO feedback will provide important insights into the success of ongoing IO efforts, help to focus efforts, provide a mechanism for identifying other potential themes and messages, and provide valuable intelligence about the AOR.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. GS Assets must be brought into the TF MDMP process early so their actions can become part of an overall targeting and maneuver concept. FM 3-13 DRAG, E-21 states, "one way to achieve this coordination and deconfliction is by beginning parallel planning as early as possible in the MDMP. The IO Officer and the targeting teams must share all pertinent information with subordinate units and adjacent and higher headquarters." One way to improve the parallel planning process is through habitual association of GS assets with a specified TF AOR.

2. Integrating the GS assets into the task force MDMP, will ensure the coordination and deconfliction as these assets move between sectors. It will also emplace a mechanism that ensures that debriefed information is shared with the appropriate staff sections in multiple sectors.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations) **MRX**

TREND 2
Subject: Building the Air/Ground Task Force

OBSERVATION: The AVN TF came together in its entirety (11 Co/Trp guidons) during the MRX and experienced challenges executing its mission.

DISCUSSION: With 11 Co/Trp guidons in the AVN TF, 4 (1 ground and 3 air) of which were new to the TF, the squadron staff had difficulty developing a common SOP that encompassed the unique requirements of all units involved. Due to the fact that the AVN TF did not have a habitual working relationship with the UH-60s, AH-64s and the MEDEVAC; the staff did not fully know/appreciate their capabilities. This was less of a problem as the units became familiar with each.

Initially, the units were still working as independent elements. The squadron commander worked very hard at integrating the new units, establishing a working relationship and creating a "TF" mentality. Furthermore, every appropriate/available asset was used on every mission, instilling a sense of teamwork.

The ground squadron and was not used to working with air assets. The lack of familiarity manifested itself initially in a dysfunctional TOC setup. The flight ops section was segregated from the current ops, making it impossible to track current air ops and hindering any air/ground integration. The TOC was rearranged and the staff personnel were retrained to combine all current ops and to track air and ground missions simultaneously. As missions progressed, air/ground integration was greatly improved.

As a result of combining OH-58Ds, UH-60As, UH-60Ls and AH-64s, all of which have uniquely different maintenance concerns, aircraft maintenance remains an issue. Units must coordinate well in advance IOT determine all maintenance requirements and to eliminate duplication of effort.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. See FM 17-95, Chapter 2, Section VII; Integrated Air and Ground Operations.
2. Aviation units must be prepared to operate as a TF. When task organized, AVN TFs must consider as a minimum:
    - Common SOPs
    - Integrated Air/Ground Current Ops
    - Staff knowledge of all capabilities
    - Combined maintenance (air) effort
    - Flight Ops integration
    - FARP compatibility with all types of aircraft.

(TA.4.4.5 synchronize Tactical Operations) **HIC**

TREND 3
Subject: C2 of Air/Ground QRF

OBSERVATION: There was a lack of guidance established by the TF headquarters on QRF launch triggers, decision points, and radio frequencies. Additionally, an AH-64 crew executing an Aerial Quick Reaction Force mission failed to execute proper check-in procedures with the ground TF Commander. This caused a loss of

situational awareness among both air and ground assets that ultimately resulted in the fratricide of one soldier and destruction of three HMMWVs.

DISCUSSION: The QRF consisted exclusively of the AVN TF elements that took received guidance from the SCO. The QRF, however, is task-organized under Task Force Falcon for command and control. Despite the fact that TF Falcon had launch authority and control of the QRF, all directions filtered through TF Saber. This led to confusion as to who controlled the QRF.

One such was a brigade level QRF that received all of its pre-employment briefings and situation updates at the squadron level. There was no direct link between the launch authority and the QRF itself. Additionally, because triggers and decision points were not developed, there was a lack of understanding of the QRF readiness levels, which caused them to feel rushed when requested by TF HQs.

On one occasion, the Air QRF, consisting of two AH-64s, was given the mission of finding and destroying a mortarman at a given loctation. The crews went from REDCON 4 to "launch now" and did not receive a current situation update from the TF staff prior to proceeding to their aircraft. The crews did receive a vague update while at were REDCON 1. Because it was near the end of their duty cycle, the aircrews had to receive a two-hour extension (AH-64 Co Cdr) to accomplish the mission.

The AH-64 crew spotted three vehicles in the vicinity of the last reported location of the mortarman. Without communications with the ground element in that sector, the AH-64 engaged with 50 rounds of 30MM. This engagement resulted in the fratricide of one soldier and the destruction of three HMMWVs. The aircraft made contact with the ground TF after the engagement was complete.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Conduct Mission Analysis to determine Troop to Task. Facilitate the orders process through utilization of the Decision Support Template to determine triggers and decision points for the employment of the QRF.
2. Units should develop standing QRF SOPs to facilitate the timely preparation and execution throughout the AOR.
3. TF HQs should retain launch authority and develop/report timely CCIR tied to the employment of the TF QRF to the AVN TF TOC.
4. QRF elements should report to TF HQs and receive a shift change brief prior to assuming QRF. This includes conducting a current situation update brief to include G2/G3/G5 prior to aircrews achieving REDCON 3 status to retain situational awareness across the AOR and prevent fratricide.
5. Units should retain unity of command. QRF establishes communications and reports REDCON 1 on the TF command net. The TF HQs should retain control of these assets and ensure positive control until contact is established with the ground TF Commander.
6. Upon mission completion, the QRF should be released from its OPCON status in support of the Ground TF Commander and reestablishes positive communications with TF Commander to provide he/she with a situation update.
7. Units should ensure all aircrews are fully trained on Use of Deadly Force and the Graduated Response Matrix IAW with the appropriate ROE.
8. Ensure all soldiers fully understand the Graduated Response Matrix.

9. Ensure all soldiers understand the criticality of positively identifying any potential threats, and verify the location of our friendly elements in the immediate vicinity to prevent fratricide.
10. Ensure the aircrews have a clear understanding of task and purpose that does not put them into an "attack" mindset.
11. Units should develop clear air/ground integration procedures throughout the TF. Aviation units conducting operations in a ground TF sector need to be aware of current operations and coordinate with the supported units in that sector.
12. QRF personnel must understand REDCON Levels.
13. Critical personnel should understand who has launch authority.
14. Once AH-64/UH-60 crews report REDCON 1, aircrews should immediately establish communications with TF G3/G2 for situation update.

(TA.4.4.5 *Synchronize Tactical Operations*) **MRX**

TREND 4
Subject: Information Management

OBSERVATION: Over-reliance on TACWEB

DISCUSSION: The Task Force staff was over-reliant on TACWEB for information sharing and exchange. BOSs and staff sections did not utilize alternate means of communication and did not have a backup plan in the event of TACWEB failure. Mass emailing of information to all echelons, done many times, often hid vital data among trivial matter. This caused it to be overlooked by key personnel in many cases. Numerous complaints were noted from staff and maneuver units about the amount of trivial email sent across the TACWEB.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Solutions to this trend lie in the fundamentals of signal support (FM 11-43, Signal Leader's Guide) and Information Operations (FM 100-6).

1. IAW FM 100-5, the G6 (S6) is the principle staff officer for all matters concerning signal operations, automation management, network management, and information security. This includes managing and controlling the use of information network capabilities and network services from the power projection sustaining base to the forward most fighting platforms. The G6 is also tasked with ensuring that redundant signal means are available to pass time sensitive battle command information from collectors to processors. Thus, the responsibility lies with the G6/S6 in ensuring that the means of redundant communications exist to ensure that all BOSs are able to share and exchange information.

2. Within each BOS, the information flow, processing, and storage are managed according to the needs of the BOS. The BOSs are responsible for their own tactical system management to include:

- Planning information exchanges
- Planning data base locations and replications

- Planning continuity of operations, including security
- Controlling and monitoring information exchanges and data base transactions
- Implementing continuity of operations plans as required
- Planning for degradation of the network

3. Appendix C of FM 100-6 outlines specific planning considerations for information systems (INFOSYS).

4. The *P.A.C.E.* technique is an effective way of outlining redundant communications means to the staff and BOS sections. The Acronym *P.A.C.E.* stands for Primary, Alternate, Contingency and Emergency. Recommend that the sections create a chart that outlines the various P.A.C.E. systems available for each echelon of command.

SAMPLE P.A.C.E

	BN /Co CPs	CMD GRP	STAFF	ETC.
P	TACWEB	COURIER	TACWEB	
A	TACFAX	TACWEB	COURIER	
C	COURIER	…	…	
E	DSN	…	…	

5. The unit must be able to segregate the "important" information from the information that is routine and not as time-sensitive. There are several techniques that could be implemented in order to do this:

- Email only time-sensitive information and post routine information on a web page
- Highlight time-sensitive information with the priority exclamation point feature provided by Microsoft Outlook
- Increase the number of distribution lists to present the option of smaller audiences
- Follow up important Emails with a secure telephone call to ensure receipt

(TA.4.1 *Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status*) **MRX**

TREND 5
Subject: Synchronization of GS/Special Staff with Higher HQs

OBSERVATION: Higher HQs often lacked situational awareness of GS assets (e.g. JMA Compliance Teams, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Multi-national Support Units, etc.) causing activities of these teams to be unsynchronized with Task Force Operations

DISCUSSION: Numerous times, GS unit operations were conducted without coordination with the task force that "owned the ground." Tasks or actions, identified as the "priority of effort" for the GS units (e.g.: Weapons Storage Site closure teams), did not appear on the list of key events briefed at the Battle Update Brief (BUB). In SASO, many of these GS assets have an extremely important and potentially dangerous mission

as they deal with the military forces, local civilian authorities, and the civilian government. In particular, units like those from the JMA are involved in the most politically sensitive aspects of implementing the mandate of the UN and NATO. Many activities have the potential to develop into exponentially large situations. Currently, these problems can arise without visibility anywhere outside the TF HQs element that tasked the mission-requirement to these units. Problems or resistance to WSS Inspections, refusal to surrender weapons, large weapon systems becoming unaccounted for, etc. can result in a larger response by the TF. This problem is set against an obvious question of how much can the G3 section maintain control. There are over 30-40 JMA Compliance Teams, PSYOP, etc.. This does not include various LNO's that move about in the different sectors.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Commanders must carefully define whom tasks and controls GS assets and put into place a protocol for routine notification of the anticipated actions of GS units in sector. The G3 must also carefully craft Information Requirements (IR) for what the G3 feels is important to track. Finally, there must be a forum for the Division to decide what actions of GS units are routine and require no further staff level action and what actions require division level synchronization. It is recommend that this be the part of the Division CoS' weekly staff meeting.

(TA.4.4.5 *Synchronize Tactical Operations*) **MRX**

TREND 6
Subject: Serious Incident Playbook

OBSERVATION: Information Operations (IO) ability to transition from Peace Support Operation (PSO) to High-Intensity Conflict (HIC) was not planned or resourced properly.

DISCUSSION: During the conduct of a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE), two shootings of Civilians on the Battlefield (COBs) created the potential for the situation to transition from PSO to HIC in a short timeframe. The TF staff/IO Section failed to conduct the necessary contingency planning to mitigate the risk involved. The TF did not possess a graduated response matrix (GRM) that tied certain indicators with the various REDCON levels indicating the transition from PSO to HIC. The TF IO Chief and staff must develop an IO graduated response matrix that supports the TF and Division graduated response matrix. The unit failed to develop and wargame a 'Serious Incident Playbook' prior to deployment to determine COA's for significant mission influencing scenarios.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. CALL: News From the Front, MAR-APR 99 or http://call.army.mil.nftf.marapr99/mootw.htm
2. Develop and wargame a Serious Incident Playbook prior to deployment.

(TA.4.3 *Determine Actions*) **MRX**

TREND 7
Subject: Selection and Function of the Battalion S5

OBSERVATION: Units are normally filling the S5 position with junior officers that have little or no training and preparation prior to assuming their duty position.

DISCUSSION: Units deploying for a contingency operation frequently pick a junior staff officer with little or no training to be the S5. This results in an S5 with no prior Civilian-Military Operations (CMO) experience working on a staff that traditionally has little experience dealing with these issues. The S5s generally are unable to assist the TF during planning or lead the TF to effective CMO integration due to their lack of knowledge and understanding of their duties and responsibilities. This leads to staffs sections not being able to fully utilize their available assets and resources (CA teams, etc) to support the TF.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should identify their S5 early and must provide whatever home-station training is available to this individual. The training should cover at a minimum their specific duties as outlined in FM 6-0 (FM 101-5), the CMO planning considerations as discussed in FM 3-07, and the utilization of attached CA teams (FM 41-10). If possible, training sessions conducted by Division or Corps G5s on roles and responsibilities would be advantageous. The battalion S5 must be familiar with the IOs, PVOs, NGOs, government offices and other agencies that exist in theater and understand the roles they fill and how to utilize them in CMO. The TF should also be trained in the role and responsibilities of the S5 and understand their specific duties for matters concerning CMO in a PSO environment.

(TA.4 *Command and Control*) **MRX**

TREND 8
Subject: Applying the Rules of Engagement (ROE)

OBSERVATION: Use of Deadly Force

DISCUSSION: During a Mission Rehearsal Exercise, soldiers from one task force fired on civilians in two separate incidents. The first incident involved the theft of a soldier's unsecured weapon by a Civilian on the Battlefield (COB) in a local village. The SAW gunner on a hardback HMMWV shouted a warning to the COB, and then fired 2-3 rounds that killed the individual. Although the ROE allows for the use of deadly force in response to theft of a weapon, the soldier did not fully employ the 5 S's (shout, show, shove, shoot warning shot, shoot to kill), the weapon wasn't loaded and the COB never attempted to point the weapon at a US soldier.

The second incident involved the theft of a rucksack by a COB at the Weapons Storage Site vicinity OP 19. The soldier SAW gunner fired 10-20 rounds, at a range of less than 2 meters, into the COB without provocation or warning. The Exercise Director declared that the COB would be assessed only as wounded due to limitations in unit capabilities and training. Otherwise the shooting would have resulted in another COB fatality and greatly increased tensions among the local populace.

Additionally, both SAW gunners were from the same company and platoon.

***TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES*:**

1. Ensure all SFOR soldiers are fully trained on Use of Deadly Force and the 5 S's in IAW the SFOR ROE Card and SFOR Handbook. Leaders and Commanders are responsible to teach ROE and the use of Deadly Force, not the staff or the Staff Judge Advocate. Identify the team early. Training on the application of the ROE must be conducted at home station.

2. Ensure all soldiers understand the UCMJ consequences of their actions for killing unarmed civilians and that common sense must be applied when interpreting the ROE.

(TA.4.4.4 *Maintain Unit Discipline*) **MRX**

TREND 9

Subject: Practical Use of the Graduated Response System by JMA (Joint Military Affairs) soldiers

OBSERVATION: **Most soldiers have a good knowledge of the ROE card and can discuss its contents. The knowledge is better at the soldier/team level than at the JMA HQs level.**

DISCUSSION: JMA teams are routinely placed in situations where they will have to employ the 5 S's (Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot Warning Shot, Shoot to Kill). Team employment of the 5 S's steadily improved throughout the exercise, but in many cases, the soldiers do not employ the 5 S's in the proper order. At the JMA operations level few soldiers are provided the opportunity to be placed in a situation where they would have to employ the 5 S's. Failure to understand the ROE and Graduated Response Measures could have an adverse impact on the JMA's mission and could endanger the lives of it's soldiers or surrounding civilians.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

Publish ROE cards for each soldier to carry and enforce their understanding.

(TA.4.3 *Determine Actions*) **MRX**

TREND 10

Subject: Training the ROE

OBSERVATION: Units make a concerted effort to train the troops on the ROE and generally speaking, soldiers understand.

DISCUSSION: The unit began training the ROE at home station. This training included mass briefings using a video produced by a previously deployed SFOR unit and briefings by the division legal office, and through the use of training vignettes.

Command emphasis on ROE training has raised the soldier's level of consciousness on the issue. The commander sent out a written directive that ROE

training using the vignettes would be carried out down to the squad level and he personally briefed the ROE during leader teach sessions prior to the start of the exercise.

Finally, the maneuver units have incorporated checks for ROE cards and reading the ROE into their PCIs and PCCs.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES: The ROE training conducted specifically addressed the four methods of training ROE [ROE Briefings, Individual Training, Collective Training and Leader/Commander Training] identified in the Rules of Engagement Handbook for Judge Advocates. Units should continue to use this approach to ROE training.

(TA.4.4.4 *Maintain Unit Discipline*) **MRX**

TREND 11
Subject: Situational Awareness at the Company Level

OBSERVATION (BCT): Company CP failed to understand friendly or enemy situation during throughout the exercise.

DISCUSSION: When asked at the final AAR to describe the friendly and enemy situation during the final fight, the response was " we never knew that for any of our missions". The Heavy Immediate Response Company HIRC, in every mission, had the potential to go anywhere in the brigade's AOR. The HIRC did not have an understanding of where the friendly situation and where friendly units were located. The most significant issue that this presents is the possibility of fratricide. On several occasions the HIRC attempted to engage friendly engineer vehicles with indirect fires. Due to poor targeting, the fires produced negligible effects, but the risk of fratricide was high. Several things attributed to this. First and foremost, there was no mechanism in place at the company level to track friendly unit locations. The only knowledge of unit locations was through the company commander who was aware of battalion size unit locations. There was little cross talk between the HIRC and other units unless directed to do so by a FRAGO during a mission. There was no adjacent unit coordination or reconnaissance to discover what or who was in the immediate area. Finally, consolidated graphics did not exist in the HIRC. The unit only had the basic brigade graphics package.

Task organization was also an area that lead to much confusion and further clouded the friendly situation. During this rotation, the attachments, if they arrived, were often not included in the planning process at all. At most they were given a brief just before crossing the LD about the order of march. When a unit receives attachments, an understanding of what their needs are and what they can bring to the fight must be understood. A system should be in place that will insure that attachments are received, briefed and cared for.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Track the battle. This has to be an assigned task. This includes both friendly and enemy situations and locations. This is not something that is only done during the actual fight. The right person that eavesdrops on the radio and takes notes will get all the

information needed. Push this information to subordinates and make sure that everyone is aware of what is around them. Discuss this during orders and rehearsals and update as time and situation permits or changes significantly.

2. Use reconnaissance to gain an understanding of the area of operation.

3. Adjacent unit coordination is a must to insure there is an understanding of friendly units in sector. During the hours of limited visibility, friendly and enemy soldiers alike. If there is an understanding that a unit is south, 200m away, the risk of fratricide is greatly reduced.

4. Consolidated graphics needs to be distributed to all vehicles. This will make it easier when cross-attachment occurs. This will also allow a plan to be developed that takes into account friendly locations and minimizes the chance of fratricide.

5. Develop a checklist that will insure that once an attachment arrives he sees the right people and has the right information (Frequencies/graphics/Class I/3/5/ect). Make sure your higher understands any issue with getting your attachments. The attachment must brief the commander about their capabilities and must attend the OPORD and any rehearsal that might be conducted. When you build your TACSOP include this checklist. For TTPs, read CALL article "Building the Perfect TACSOP" at http://call.army.mil/products/trngqtr/tq1-02/guillory.htm .

(TA.4.1.3.4 *Manage Information Distribution*) **L**

TREND 12

Subject: Detachment Operating Base (DOB) Operations and Battle Tracking

OBSERVATION (BCT): Detachment Operating Base (DOB) command post functions were inconsistent. Throughout the exercise, typically only the commander had a clear understanding of what was occurring. In some cases, no two people had the same picture of the battle.

DISCUSSION: The quality and use of DOB tracking charts and maps directly affected battle tracking. Typically, they should show team situations, communication windows, and the latest instructions to teams. The charts should highlight the status of SOR, critical grids, and recent coordination with the teams. Unfortunately, DOBs seldom posted intelligence summary (INTSUM) or operational summary (OPSUM) information to the maps or charts and, as such, was unable to analyze the effects of those changes on the unit. The commander, who possessed situational understanding, performed many of these tasks alone. However, he is only one person with many competing requirements. Without continuous updating, situational maps (sitmaps) become useless. At a minimum, the DOB should do the following:

1. Maintain up-to-date operational graphics
2. Receive, analyze and distribute pertinent information
3. Maintain focus on friendly and enemy situations (through S2/S3 channels)
4. Maintain a log of all coordination, graphics updates, and decisions
5. Maintain current information on Fire Support coordination, NFA's (no-fire areas) and RFA's (restricted fire areas).

6. Establish a shift change brief that transfers all relevant information encompasses all ongoing coordination and mission requirements.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. All DOBs should re-look and analyze their information display techniques including its charts, standardized map boards, overlays, and timelines to verify if it captures the full picture in the most user friendly manner and presents the best overall synchronized picture of the total brigade fight. The DOB tracking charts and map board should paint that picture for even the most junior soldier.

2. DOB shift changes are critical handoffs in battle tracking – develop and codify the desired shift change brief in your TACSOP to ensure details are not carelessly lost in the transition. Briefs make or break these handoffs. If information is going to be misplaced, it occurs between shifts. Good logs, display boards, coordination tracking boards, and shift change briefs prevent loss of critical information. Take time to set the DOB up at home station to make sure that all know what "right" looks like.

3. See http://call.army.mil/products/newsltrs/02-2/02-2ch1.htm - Chapter 1 to Newsletter 02-02 and http://call.army.mil/products/newsltrs/02-2/02-2ch2.htm - Chapter 2 to Newsletter 02-02 for some superb recommendations on DOB operations for the LRSD. Also review Appendix D to Newsletter 02-02 at http://call.army.mil/products/newsltrs/02-2/02-2appd.htm for Detachment Operating Base Observation Checklists. In addition, the following address offers a superb and comprehensive PowerPoint slideshow teach on DOB operations: http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/OPS/LRS/lrsd3/DOB%20OPS.ppt.

(TA.4.1.3 *Maintain Information and Force Status*) **L**

TREND 13

Subject: Thinking and Planning as an Aviation Task Force

OBSERVATION: Frequently aviation units are fighting at CMTC as Task Forces yet the staffs do not possess a TF mindset needed to exploit the advantages presented by combining aircraft. This results in the TF being misutilized and inefficient. There is no formal integration training prior to the actual deployment. TF HQ's SOPs, TTPs and maintenance procedures often do not compliment a Task Force.

DISCUSSION: An OH-58D Air Cavalry Troop (ACT) was attached to a General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB). The GSAB conducted no formal integration training and did not have a plan to effectively integrate the ACT into GSAB operations. The first time the GSAB staff met the Troop commander was after deployment to CMTC. The GSAB staff was unfamiliar with OH-58D capabilities and had difficulty integrating the Kiowa Warriors into the battle. Cavalry specific missions were treated as taskings and passed directly to the troop for coordination and execution. The battalion conducted limited mission analysis and provided vague guidance to the troop. As a result of the GSAB staff's unfamiliarity with cavalry missions and the lack of cavalry representation

on the staff, there was no formal military decision making process. The S-2 did not know what particular intelligence information was of use to the cavalry and, consequently, intelligence did not drive maneuver. The GSAB's newly revised SOP did not reference anything pertaining to attached units, so issues such as FARP operations, DART operations, and air-to-ground integration were resolved in the midst of an ongoing operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. As soon as the aviation TF is formed, key leaders and/or staffs of the TF units need to conduct face-to-face coordination. Integration issues need to be identified and a formalized pre-deployment training plan established.
2. Develop a TF SOP or at least a supplement to the parent unit's SOP and integrate it into the pre-deployment training plan.
3. Ensure all TF units have proper representation (LNOs) on the parent unit staff. Conduct a formal MDMP exercise with all the LNOs prior to deployment IAW FM 101-5.
4. Ensure the TF staff understands the limits and capabilities of all TF units.

(TA.4.4 *Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces*) **HIC**

TREND 14
Subject: Command Console Aircraft

OBSERVATION (BCT): General Support Aviation Battalions (GSABs) and associated Support Aviation Companies (SACs) deploy without fully operational command console equipped aircraft. Commanders and aircrew members indicate inadequate maintenance support and limited home station training on the command console. Associated C3 operational procedures remain dysfunctional between supported units and aviation units. Because of this, C2 missions are either canceled or not scheduled due to unfamiliarity and lack of training.

DISCUSSION:

1. Support Aviation Company Commanders indicate required AVUM/AVIM maintenance support remains limited for the command console (AN/ASC 15B with Modification 1). Commanders also report AVIM command console manuals are not available. Command Console major components consist of the console and a map board. The modified console integrates a suite of improved radios (3xAN/ARC 210 FM/VHF/UHF radios with SINCGARS and HAVEQUICK II capability, 1xAN/ARC 220 HF radio, and integrated SATCOM radio) and six ICS (internal communication system) boxes for receiving/transmitting on the console radio systems. The back row of the UH-60 contains a map board with four additional ICS boxes mounted with a workspace table. Due to reported maintenance challenges, units consistently deploy without requisite map boards and worktables and/or fully operational consoles thereby severely restricting the TF CDR's capability to conduct C3 operations.
2. When tasked to provide a Command Console equipped aircraft in support of a ground maneuver HQs, units fail to conduct required special coordination IAW ARTEP-1-113-MTP (Task 01-2-1337.01-0NRC). Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) do not fully

encompass mission requirements to ensure uninterrupted battle tracking and continuous support.

3. Aircrew members report receiving limited training on the command console and most crewmembers remain unfamiliar with the operational characteristics of the AN/ASC15B MOD1.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Although no DA publication exists for the AN/ASC15B MOD1, installation contracts prescribed system training and provided a Training Support Package. Units should contact their Brigade Aviation Maintenance Officer to obtain required references, ensure contract fulfillment and reaffirm command console maintenance support within the Brigade. The maintenance officer should also coordinate for sustainment system training classes through the installation contractor. Also, companies should ascertain full system accountability to repair and recover all critical components of the command console for maximum capability in future operations.

2. The C2 Platoon Leader or AMC for a C3 Mission should attend supported unit briefings and rehearsals to provide proper support. The C2 Platoon Leader or AMC should determine the following mission requirements from the supported unit as part of his TLPs:

a. PZ / LZ with associated timeline
b. Mission station time to determine aircraft configuration (external tanks), relief on station requirements (aircraft swap and/or console swap in conjunction with FARP requirements).
c. Required frequencies to pre-program with a complete commo card
d. Signal support to assist in building loadsets, if necessary.
e. Console operator PCI timelines and locations; A common aviation misconception prevalent at CMTC indicates trained console operators must be provided by the supported unit—no doctrine supports this misconception and further negates command console effectiveness. Coordination to ensure a trained operator must be made early in the planning process for C3 operations at the BN-level.
f. Verify routes and Restricted Operating Zones (ROZ); ensure early ROZ submission and that it is established based on METT-TC. S-3/G-3 (Air) should procedurally deconflict airspace for all airspace users while ensuring the maximum communications link.
g. Map board requirements; i.e. what maps to have available and who posts the operational graphics for the commander.

Immediately upon receipt of the WARNO, the C2 Platoon leader or Air Mission Commander (AMC) should contact the S-3/G-3 (Air) to communicate crew/aircraft capabilities and limitations early in the planning process; essential he knows the status of his crews/aircraft for all modes of flight. Critical to his planning, the relief on station must be rehearsed with all aircrew members.

3. Companies should develop an in-house Command Console Training Program to educate all aircrew members on the basic operating characteristics (Performance Planning Card, security in aircraft, required equipment), basic trouble-shooting procedures, ANCD Loading Procedures and capabilities; the unit signal officer should remain an integral member of this program. Challenges to conducting training for ground

maneuver units without organic command consoles mandates home station training of console operators at the battalion or even company level. The ability to frequently train with this system, especially at home station will aid in the overall understanding of its capabilities.

(TA.4.4 *Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces*) **HIC**

TREND 15
Subject: Time Management

OBSERVATION: Changing timelines, failing to consider all inputs and events requiring time, failure of subordinate units to begin preparation based on SOPs or published guidance, and adjusting the timing of events stripped valuable preparation time from units and tended to cause leaders to become so exhausted their performance suffered.

DISCUSSION:

1. The 1/3-2/3 rule, without prudent use of WARNOs and clear preparation guidance and SOPs, fosters sequential - not parallel planning.
2. Units generally fail to consider all factors that influence allocation of preparation time and timing of events (Threat timelines/event templates, weather, light data, subordinate unit preparation steps, impact on subordinate units of pulling leaders to higher HQ events, CSS actions, etc.)
3. Units, and senior leaders believe the solution to timeline management is to do each MDMP step faster, furthering the sequential nature of our planning, and causing junior units to waste time while awaiting guidance or orders.
4. Units fail to "see themselves" in terms of capabilities and status of preparation due to failure to track completion of preparation events/steps and often unknowingly cause steps to be missed by pulling subordinate leaders to higher unit events unhinging critical TLP actions.
5. Units fail to understand the impact of changing established timelines because they don't require subordinate units to provide their internal timelines so can't assess the impact of timeline changes on overall unit preparedness.
6. Units believe timeline management is completing orders faster as opposed to utilizing all of time available, and how the sequencing of events, across multiple echelons, must be synchronized in a manner that allows each element to accomplish vital preparatory tasks simultaneously. This requires higher HQs to understand the time available, the inputs required by subordinates to conduct parallel preparation, and to treat subordinate unit timelines similar to training schedules – contracts between leaders regarding events and timing.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Consider and track weather/light data, OPFOR/Threat event templates/timelines, own and subordinate unit timelines (to include all BOS) and post all key events in planning and preparation to an Integrated Timeline.

2. Ensure timelines allow subordinate unit parallel planning, instead of sequential planning and preparation. Include specific preparation guidance in SOPs and WARNOs to ensure parallel preparation.

3. Allow time for the Commander to attend key sub-unit events.

4. Spread the timeline out but include quality WARNOs to ensure higher unit staffs aren't exhausted and unable to answer questions while sub-units commence their MDMP (the 1/3-2/3 rule can be made obsolete if WARNOs are done too standard and enable parallel planning – it would become a 1/10 – 9/10 rule where each echelon would work one step behind its higher HQ in MDMP).

5. Ensure subordinate units have enough time between directed events to provide guidance and enabling information to conduct parallel preparation.

6. Track subordinate unit preparation based on the timeline. If changes to conditions occur (i.e., units have not completed steps in the time allocated), reprioritize events, and reallocate time.

(TA.4.3 *Determine Actions*) **HIC**

MOBILITY/SURVIVIABILITY BOS

Positive Performance:

TREND 1
Subject: Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC)

OBSERVATION: The Task Force HHT command section (HHT commander/First Sergeant) were effectively employed as the nucleus of the BDOC

DISCUSSION: BDOC operations and liaison with contract guard forces are major tasks within the Task Force and primary concerns in overall Force Protection. During an SFOR MRE rotation, the HHT commander and First Sergeant were both effectively utilized as the command and control over the squadron's BDOC operations at a forward location. As experienced leaders within the Task Force, they both carried the weight and credibility throughout the Task Force necessary to ensure these important functions were accomplished to standard. Additionally, by handling the overall BDOC functions, the Task Force-main command post was relieved of the day-to-day administrative oversight requirements in monitoring

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES:

1. See FM 71-2 MTP Task: Establish a Base Camp (Infantry Battalion/Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force) (07-1-1234)

(TA.6.3.2 *Employ Operations Security*) **MRX**

Needs Emphasis:

TREND 1
Subject: Breach Operations

OBSERVATION (BCT): Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are unable to execute breach operations to standard.

DISCUSSION: BCTs are unable to execute breach operations to standard due to poor planning at the BCT and TF level. Planning staffs routinely fail to identify a breach area and a point of penetration during COA development and then refine it during wargaming. Since the BCT fails to identify a point of penetration, the reverse breach planning process becomes flawed and yields ineffective task organization recommendations. At the BCT level, a task organization must be developed during planning that provides resources to the breaching TF allowing them to properly execute breach operations. This often requires massing engineer and maneuver reduction assets, and is consistently not planned well. At the TF level, task organization must then be effected to resource a support, breach, and assault force. When a clear point of penetration is not identified during planning, an ineffective task organization is developed and the BCT generally fails to execute the breach fundamentals – SOSRA (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault). This becomes evident at the combined arms rehearsal (CAR) where SOSRA is either not discussed, or covered superficially. This contrasts directly with the level of detail given to the fire and observation plan during the CAR. During execution, the BCT fails to execute decisively at a point of breach, generally developing the situation until the "TF finds a place to breach". Due to ineffective task organization, the TF generally exhausts breaching assets prior to penetration. At BCT level, the result is lost momentum, and a failure to successfully execute a breach.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. At BCT level, identify a breach area and point of breach IAW FM 3-34.2 Combined Arms Breaching Operations early during the planning process. Execute reverse-breach planning based on the determined point of breach during wargaming to synchronize all BOS assets to support the breach. The Collection plan must both identify OBSINTEL requirements and observers and enemy Intel requirements on the near side and far side of the breach.

2. Identify breaching operations as a critical task in the commander's intent and insure decision points that support breaching operations are reflected in the decision support matrix.

3. Develop a task organization based on the results of reverse breach planning to ensure subordinate TFs have the ability to task organize for a successful breach. TFs must task organize to execute a breach; the breach organization requires a support force, and breach force, and an assault force. Mass breach equipment within the breach force, including both engineer and maneuver assets.

4. Rehearse breach fundamentals (SOSRA) in detail at both TF and BCT CARs.
(TA.6.1.1.1 *Breach Obstacles*) **HIC**

TREND 2
Subject: Understanding Roles and Responsibilities of the Decontamination Unit

OBSERVATION (BCT): Additional training is needed on the duties and responsibilities of decontaminating units, logistics planning for decontamination operations and evacuating contaminated remains in the BCT area of operations.

DISCUSSION: Most units do not have a clear understanding of who is responsible for command and control, logistics requirements and functions, and collection and decontamination of remains in the BCT area of operations. Because of this, units are not properly trained on the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) of these important logistics functions.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Decontamination Operation Command and Control:

The execution of a decontamination mission as a result of a chemical strike is a battalion or brigade mission and should be controlled by the battalion or brigade executive officer. Decontamination operations are very labor, people, logistics, and time intensive. IAW FM 3-5, page 4-3, the senior person present assumes control of the DECON operation. For maneuver forces, the battalion or brigade executive officer is the most effective person to assume control of the DECON operations. A great deal of thought and coordination must go into DECON operations other than ensuring DECON assets are attached. Additional assets must be coordinated to support the thorough DECON from within the battalion or brigade TOC. Engineer, air defense, and military police assets can be coordinated to support a thorough decontamination well before any chemical attacks have occurred. Additionally, coordination through the Forward Support Battalion Support Operations Officer (SPO) for bulk water, equipment replacement, and patient DECON must occur.

2. Logistics Considerations for Thorough Decontamination:

a. First, decontaminating an armor company requires approximately 7000 gallons of water to decontaminate 14 tanks and an additional 4000 gallons to decontaminate unit personnel and their equipment. This water requirement maximizes the Main Support Battalion (MSB) direct support water hauling capability of 15,000 gallons. Thus, the division logistical planners in conjunction with the COSCOM logistical planners must identify the water and supply requirements for the thorough decontamination and reconstitution of any unit greater than company size. Planners at all levels must realize that when a unit is contaminated with a persistent chemical most supplies and some equipment cannot be decontaminated; such as tentage, OCIE, and most class I. Planners must consider the reconstitution time, location, and resources available to bring the unit up to full combat power and readiness.

b. A second logistical consideration is the decontamination of remains on the battlefield. IAW JTTP 4-06, contaminated remains are evacuated by the unit to the Mortuary Affairs Decontamination Collection Point (MADCP). However, in operations where the scale of the contaminated remains does not warrant the employment of a MADCP, the nearest mortuary affairs collection point (MACP) is responsible for decontaminating and evacuating remains (JTTP 4-06, app D, Para 3b), in this case the MACP in the FSB. TTPs for decontamination and evacuation of remains are as follows: The FSB MACP receives tasking with POC name and location of unit needing assistance. A decontamination team assembles required supplies and moves to POC location. The team meets with the unit POC, along with their NBC personnel, and receives a local situation report and/or NBC report. The team, NBC personnel, and POC move to the edge of the contaminated area where the unit has brought the remains. Mortuary affairs personnel, using the MADCP wash and rinse procedures, process remains and effects. Remains and effects are placed in a human remains pouch moved outside the contaminated area. The remains and effects are then placed in another human remains pouch and marked with a "C" for contaminated. Remains are moved back to the CP, segregated, and tested for contamination. Remains are moved to the Theater QC Station at the Theater Evacuation Point. These TTPs are further outlined in JTTP 4-06 appendix D.

(TA.6.3.1.2.1 Decontaminate Personnel and Systems) **HIC**

TREND 3
Subject: Quick Reaction Force Employment

OBSERVATION: Confusion exists within units as to the difference between the different levels of reaction forces and release authority/commitment criteria for each.

DISCUSSION: At each fixed installation there are generally forces designated as quick reaction forces for perimeter type events, i.e., reinforcement of front gate, reaction to perimeter intrusion. Companies operating in the units sector may also have designated reaction forces to reinforce or support patrols and checkpoints. Often these forces are committed forces in lieu of having a true uncommitted reserve, i.e., these units are operating somewhere within the plan-prep-execute-recover continuum for daily operations. Therefore reaction forces may be employed and become "committed" forces at a subordinate level without the knowledge and release of the higher headquarters.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Orders and SOPs need to clearly designate whether QRF are to be committed or uncommitted forces.
2. SOPs must be developed that establishes readiness conditions (REDCONs) for QRFs. SOPs must translate these REDCON levels into specific vehicle, equipment and soldier postures.
3. REDCON levels should be tied to specific CCIR.

(TA.6.3.2 Employs Operations Security) **MRX**

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Needs Emphasis:

TREND 1
Subject: 5988E and PMCS Standards

Observation: (BCT): Lack of published or enforced standard leads to inadequate oversight of PMCS procedures.

DISCUSSION: Most units deploy to CMTC with established PMCS procedures or an SOP detailing maintenance operations or system in place. These procedures are normally designed for garrison operations and, while this is effective in garrison, during combat training operations the reality is that readiness declines as the rotation progresses. Unlike in garrison, the unit is greatly dispersed and has many other tasks that compete for the limited time and assets of the company or team. Though many soldiers state that equipment readiness declines due to hard use, many faults identified are simple and could have easily been avoided if the Company Maintenance Team (CMT) had oversight or knowledge of the faults. This lack of visibility can be directly attributed to poor PMCS procedures and 5988E tracking and reporting.

One of the major obstacles to combat operations maintenance and 5988E flow is the SOP. Some units try to use their garrison SOP and find that their units and leadership do not have the time required to do a complete, by the numbers, PMCS with leader verification due to pre-battle prep at all levels. As a result PMCS and/or 5988Es are not completed and updated through ULLS-G, causing parts-flow and PLL replenishment to be slow; if parts are even requested. This results in minor repairs not being completed due to a lack of parts. Had these 5988Es been used and updated in ULLS-G, faults could be anticipated, and parts ordered prior to the equipment becoming non-operational.

Because of this, the unit's combat power is declining, yet the TF / BDE XO does not have a clear picture of the total combat power of the TF or BCT. This impacts planning as the assets that are believed to be on hand during the planning phase seldom replicate what crosses LD. With proper use of STAMIS (Standard Tactical Automated Maintenance Information System), coupled with chain of command involvement and adhering to established maintenance management procedures, TF and BCT leaders will have a clear picture of the total combat power of the BCT through ULLS-G and SAMS.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Use current Army Pre-combat Check Lists (PCL) (available on all ETM CDs, e.g. TM 9-2350-252-PCL). This is a listing of 5 to 25 critical items to be checked prior to combat operations. As stated on the PCL, this does NOT replace the appropriate PMCS and is to be used only when authorized by the commander. Units should make a checklist as determined by the unit leadership.
2. Require 5988E / 2404s be turned in to the PSG or 1SG prior to LOGPAC. This ensures that dispatches are still valid and equipment is mission capable. This also gives the chain of command a good picture of their current combat power at the Company / Team level. The 1SG should then take the 5988E to the LOGPAC and give

to the ULLS-G clerk for updating as required. The crew should have a second copy or a manual 2404 to keep a historic record of their vehicle's status and allows a crew level verification that their faults are being recorded on the 5988E when it is generated and returned.

3. If a vehicle is FMC the 5988E / 2404 is returned to the crew. If there is a fault annotated, it is forwarded to the maintenance team for verification of fault and prioritizing. At this level the verified 5988E / 2404 gives a more detailed picture to the TF XO on the available combat power for the TF during the MDMP process, allowing him to assign missions to elements capable of accomplishing them. See the timeline below for clarity on 5988E flow from crew through BMS and return:



4. Commanders need to establish a standard that can be achieved and implemented across the unit without degrading its maintenance, but also taking into consideration continuous operations and time constraints. Develop a tracking mechanism within the TF / BCT which gives the most current status of PMCS and 5988E flow through the unit. This enables the chain of command to determine combat power at LD, prioritize maintenance assets and plan accordingly. Using the BMS as the TF point of contact is a technique which we have seen work very well in rotations in the past. As a result of task organization, CO/TMs that are attached to a new battalion may be unfamiliar with that battalion's maintenance procedures. To maximize readiness and lessen the learning time at a CTC or in combat, Task Forces should ensure that all units within their organization are thoroughly familiar with its maintenance procedures prior to deployment.

(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventive Maintenance) **HIC**

TREND 2
Subject: Interaction with Civil Authorities/Local Officials

OBSERVATION: Civil authorities were often met with distrust and contempt when asking for help in maintaining a safe & secure environment in their sector.

DISCUSSION: The TF placed little emphasis on candid interaction with the civil authorities. For example, the CIVPOL (Civilian Police) from a nearby village approached the AVN TF asking for help in conducting a cordon and search mission the next day. The vignette was designed to help the TF foster these types of relationships and allow a realistic execution of events. Frequently, the American military in Kosovo will participate in cordon operations while the CIVPOL handles the search portion. However, the CIVPOL were given no clear answer, and the next day, the AVN TF executed a cordon and search in the village without coordinating or informing civilian authorities (ie. the Mayor). This contributed to a high level of distrust.

TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES:

1. In order to meet COMKFOR's intent of handing Kosovo slowly back to the civil authorities, it is imperative that units do everything possible to support them. Once the CIVPOL and other organizations understand the techniques and equipment used by our forces, they can begin to execute these operations with less support.

2. FM 3-0, paragraph 11-17 explains the importance of effectively integrating civil/military authorities into IO campaign plans to facilitate unit objectives. In short, it states:

> "Civilian/Military Operations encompass activities that commanders take to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities—both governmental and nongovernmental—and the civilian populace…Commanders direct these activities in friendly, neutral, or hostile AOs to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives…CMO is the decisive and timely application of planned activities that enhance the relationship between military forces and civilian authorities and population. They promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. CMO range from support to combat operations to assisting countries in establishing political, economic, and social stability."

3. Overall, when interacting with the civilian populace, especially their leaders, it is critical that soldiers understand the type of relationship the commander is attempting to establish. Soldiers performing FP duties as well as those interacting with the civilians through routine patrols must ensure that they send a clear and consistent message. For further information on the integration of CMO into IO campaign plans, refer to FM 3-0, Chapter 11, JP 3-57, and FM 3-13 (Information Operations).

(TA.7.8 Conduct Civil Affair in Area) ***MRX***

TREND 3
Subject: **LRP Meetings**

Observation: Units continue to have inadequate LRP Meetings

Discussion: Units are challenged to conduct an efficient LRP meeting that exchanges critical information and addresses the next 12-24 hours of logistical support. The result is decreased situational awareness, improper forecasting of supplies, and reactive vs. anticipatory logistics support during the Task Force battle.

Techniques and Procedures:

1. Standardize the LRP meeting format in the TF SOP.
2. Train the LRP meeting during FTX's. Incorporate CSS rehearsals into the LRP format.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force) **L**

TREND 4
Subject: CASEVAC Planning

OBSERVATION (BCT): The ability to sustain and preserve the fighting force depends on responsive and well-executed CSS planning. The most important part of this is our ability to respond for Casualty Evacuation at the Detachment/Team level.

DISCUSSION: The unit did very little CASEVAC planning in advance, and executed mostly reactionary CASEVAC to the losses sustained when contact occurred, achieving some, albeit misleading, success. For the most part, because of the SOP to avoid contact at almost all costs in conjunction with the complexity of providing reliable evacuation planning throughout the depth of sector without compromising the mission, units sometimes think that CASEVAC is "a bridge too far". Units must work to resolve these issues and plan and rehearse potential casualty treatment. Due to our restricted communications architecture, notification or realization of casualties is already slow; when compounded by a reactive casualty evacuation plan instead of proactive plan, casualties do have little chance for survival.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

There are many things that can be done to improve CASEVAC – the most significant is to plan it and integrate it in rehearsals. Units need to think outside the "box" and closely track plans and actual locations of adjacent units that may be able to assist with casualty evacuation. This can work particularly well during windows when brigade-level assets begin to close with our area of reconnaissance. When units are deeper in sector and farther from other friendly units, they will be forced to rely even more heavily on pre-positioned or forward positioned assets. Non-standard ground evacuation assets can be positioned and hidden as far forward as possible IAW METT-T (either forward of the FLOT if the enemy situation is more sparse or just behind the FLOT if enemy situation does not allow for it). Additionally, emergency launch MEDEVAC aircraft can be

planned, rehearsed and executed if the appropriate amount of emphasis is placed on this important subject at both detachment and brigade level. In light of the difficulties that will always exist between the ability and need to evacuate casualties and the fear that such evacuation will compromise the rest of the mission with the risk of losing the aircraft, special emphasis should be placed on supplemental medical training for LRSD (Long Range Surveillance Detachment) personnel to enhance their medical treatment skills above that of the basic combat lifesaver. Home station CASEVAC walk-throughs and talk-throughs will help this Detachment's understanding of proper evacuation procedures and SOPs – in addition it may help the teams to understand how much effort the Detachment intends to put into casualty evacuation planning. I will also help personnel understand how challenging it is in light of METT-T conditions. The 1SG and XO should brief all key players on the SOPs they develop and should ensure that the TACSOP is refined to include details on expectations for CASEVAC planning, rehearsals, reporting and execution.

The TACSOP should include standard PCCs and PCIs of CASEVAC players for graphics, routes to and from planned DCCPs (detachment casualty collection points) and routes to the nearest Level II care treatment area in the event of ground evacuation. Finally, add to the SOP the tracking and reporting method for the Detachment CP, so that the standards are understood in advance. See CALL Newsletter 02-02 for information on an enhanced Combat Lifesavers Course (http://call.army.mil/products/newsltrs/02-2/02-2appg.htm).